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‘Earth is the cradle of mankind; but one cannot stay in the cradle forever.’1 
Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Soviet space pioneer (1911) 
 
‘The United States will lead the return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration and 
utilization, followed by human missions to Mars and other destinations.’2 
Donald Trump, President of the United States of America 
(2017) 
 
‘It’s not going to be a vacation jaunt.’3  
Elon Musk, founder and CEO of Space Exploration 
Technologies (‘SpaceX’) (2014) 
 
The prospect of humanity becoming an ‘interplanetary species’4 is shifting from the realm of 
science fiction to science fact. The growth of the global space sector in the last 20 years, 
spurred by the competitiveness of telecommunications industries, has led to increased 
investment in satellite and launch technology. Governments and entrepreneurs alike are 
                                                            
1 From an undisclosed letter in 1911, quoted in Fountain, L M, 'Creating Momentum in Space: 
Ending the Paralysis Produced by the Common Heritage of Mankind Doctrine' (2003) 35 
Connecticut Law Review 1753, 1753.  
2 Donald Trump, ‘Reinvigorating America’s Human Space Exploration Program’ (Presidential 
Memorandum, 11 December 2017) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/presidential-memorandum-reinvigorating-americas-human-space-exploration-
program/> (date accessed: 18 February 2018). 
3 Andersen, R, Exodus (30 December 2014) Aeon <https://aeon.co/essays/elon-musk-puts-
his-case-for-a-multi-planet-civilisation> (date accessed: 18 February 2018).  
4 Musk, E, ‘Making Humans a Multi-Planetary Species’ (2017) 5(2) New Space 46, 49. 
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starting to see the potential to harness and repurpose this technology in aid of a loftier goal: 
that of taking human beings to Mars. The private sector has seized the initiative from national 
space agencies, developing plans that anticipate human presence on Mars by 2030. These 
plans anticipate the first human settlers undertaking a one-way trip; setting up a new life on 
Mars and harvesting water and mineral resources to sustain a population. Such plans, coming 
as they are from technologists, are typically technical in nature; issues of law, governance, 
health and environment are relegated for later consideration. For the international lawyer, 
however, an obvious question arises. Would the creation and conduct of a human settlement 
on Mars, with its implications of permanence and resource-use, comply with international law?  
In order to answer this broad question, it is necessary first to establish the nature and content 
of law as it applies in outer space. In this introduction, I will outline the development of 
international space law. It is a small but dynamic field. Given the breadth of my research 
question, I will also set out the assumptions on which this paper will proceed. Finally, I set out 
some resource challenges faced while writing this paper, and how I have accommodated them. 
A NATURE AND CONTENT OF INERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 
Much like other branches of public international law, space law has its origins in the need to 
establish clear and simple rules to govern relations between members of an increasingly 
organised international community. While scientists, philosophers and creatives have long 
turned their attentions to outer space, there ‘was no legal dimension to this sphere’.5 With the 
appearance of new technologies in the mid-20th century, especially rocket technology first 
used in WWII, air law specialists began turning their attentions to the public and private law 
issues this innovation might raise. A powerful drive towards creating a new branch of 
international space law came from geopolitical considerations. In the late 1950s the military 
competition between rival superpowers of USA and USSR, characterised by the rapid 
development of nuclear arms, seemed poised to extend into outer space. In 1957 the USSR 
launched the first man-made object into outer space. For complex political, economic and 
                                                            
5 Jankowitsch, P, ‘The background and history of space law’ in von der Dunk, F and 
Tronchetti, F Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Incorporated, 2015), 1.  
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technological reasons, however, this realm of competition remained peaceful – a civilian ‘space 
race’.  
A number of international agreements and guidelines for the use of outer space characterise 
the first phase of space law development. A bilateral agreement known as the 1963 Partial 
Test Ban Treaty (subsequently UNGA resolution) was concluded establishing that outer space 
remain free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.6 This was quickly 
followed in 1967 by the Outer Space Treaty7 establishing international principles for the 
peaceful exploration of outer space,8 for the common benefit of all mankind.9  The signing and 
entry into force of the Outer Space Treaty signified the ambitious creation of an entirely new 
branch of public international law. Unlike the continents and seas ‘discovered’ by European 
empires in previous centuries, outer space was not to be subject to national appropriation.10 
Unlike the high seas, which had long been a theatre of war, outer space was to be reserved for 
‘peaceful purposes’.11 A follow up treaty known as the 1979 Moon Agreement12 was even more 
expansive, designating the moon and its natural resources as the ‘common heritage of 
mankind’.13 This treaty is considered a failure as it has not been ratified by any major space-
faring nation.14  
                                                            
6 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 
done 5 August 1963, entered into force 10 October 1963, 480 UNTS 43; Question of general 
and complete disarmament, UNGA Res. 1884(XVIII), of 17 October 1963; UN Doc. 
A/RES/18/1844.  
7 Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done 27 January 1967, 610 UNTS 205 
(‘Outer Space Treaty’). As of January 2017, 105 countries are parties to the treaty, while 
another 24 have signed the treaty but have not completed ratification.  
8 Outer Space Treaty preamble, arts III-IV. 
9 Outer Space Treaty art I.  
10 Outer Space Treaty arts preamble, art II.  
11 Outer Space Treaty preamble, Art IV. 
12 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done 
18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984, 1363 UNTS 3 (‘Moon Agreement’). As of 
November 2016, it has been ratified by 17 states. 
13 Moon Agreement art XI. 
14 Jankowitsch, P, above n. 5, 6.  
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The second phase of space law development was the negotiation and entry into force of three 
other space treaties: 
• 1968 Rescue Agreement:15 elaboration of principles in Article V Outer Space Treaty on 
the rights and obligations of States concerning the rescue of persons in space. 
• 1972 Liability Convention:16 the launching State bears absolute liability for damage 
caused by its space object on Earth or in flight.  
• 1975 Registration Convention:17 implementation of principles in Article VIII Outer Space 
Treaty requiring states to furnish to the United Nations with details about the orbit of 
each space object. 
The third phase of space law development has been a more proliferation of ‘soft law’; various 
non-binding rules developed in bilateral agreements (especially by the United States), non-
legal agreements between major space agencies such as NASA and ESA, and UN General 
Assembly resolutions.18 This web of State practice effectively establishes a code of conduct 
which plays a role in setting the basis for future treaty negotiations. 
Some authors argue that a fourth phase of space law is yet called for; ‘hard law’ in the fields of 
security and safety of space operations which need a guarantee of long-term sustainability and 
juridical certainty. It is argued that new rules and regulations require the legitimacy and 
universality that can only be provided by the United Nations. Further, space law instruments, 
foremost of which the Outer Space Treaty, are State-centric; establishing a system of State 
responsibility, authorisation and liability for all activities. The rapid growth of commercial space 
industries presents real challenges to this regime as States look to incentivise non-State actors 
to adopt the costly and risky business of space exploration.  
                                                            
15 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, done 22 April 1968, entered into force 3 December 1968, 672 
UNTS 119 (‘Rescue Agreement’).  
16 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, done 29 March 
1972, entered into force 1 September 1972, 961 UNTS 187 (‘Liability Convention’). 
17 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, done 14 January 1975, 
entered into force 15 September 1976, 1023 UNTS 15 (‘Registration Convention’).  
18 Jankowitsch, P, above n. 5, 27. 
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B THE QUESTION TO BE ANSWERED 
Broadly, the question to be answered is whether the creation and conduct of a human 
settlement on Mars would comply with international law. I break the question down as follows: 
Chapter II: Does the establishment and conduct of a human settlement fall within the 
freedom of activities anticipated in Article I Outer Space Treaty? 
Chapter III: Does Article I oblige settlers to share the profits (if any) of their activities 
with Earth? 
Chapter IV: Does the establishment of the settlement constitute an appropriation 
within the terms of Article II Outer Space Treaty? 
Chapter V: Are settlers entitled to exclude others from the settlement? 
C ASSUMPTIONS 
The framing of this paper requires the exercise of a little imagination. Despite rapid 
technological progress, no human settlement has been established outside Earth. The 
International Space Station is the closest existing analogy; however it is of limited assistance in 
an enquiry into the state of law on Mars because it is regulated by a multi-lateral treaty and 
other agreements between the participant states.19  
For the purposes of this paper, the question of who settles Mars is an important one. As 
discussed above, the private sector is playing a crucial role in the development of technology, 
and the expression of concrete plans. While they may go it alone, Musk has recently speculated 
that ‘ultimately this is going to be a huge public-private partnership.’20 There is some debate 
                                                            
19 Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the 
European Space Agency, The Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian 
Federation, and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation on 
the Civil International Space Station, done 29 January 1998, entered into force 27 March 
2001, TIAS no 12927; Cm 4552; see generally Von der Dunk, F, ‘International Space Law’ in 
Von der Dunk, F and Tronchetti, F, Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham, 2015) 114.  
20 Musk, above n. 4, 57. 
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in space law literature about the extent to which private actors are bound by the Outer Space 
Treaty; accordingly to what extent the constraints imposed on activity and ownership in space 
might apply to Musk and his competitors. For the purposes of this paper, however, I rely on 
Article VI Outer Space Treaty as the determinative rule. Article VI provides: 
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities 
in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities 
are carried on my governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for 
assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set 
forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorisation and 
continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.21   
I discuss the import of this provision in detail in Chapter IV. For the purposes of the whole 
paper, I assume that private operators and other non-governmental entities are bound by the 
Outer Space Treaty to the same extent as the State of that organisation’s registration. A 
question that I do not address in this paper is whether non-governmental operators may 
operate under a ‘flag of convenience’ in order to avoid the operation of the treaty. It is outside 
the scope of this paper to consider the question of whether the treaty is jus cogens, and 
accordingly not vulnerable to that strategy – for the reasons discussed in section D below.  
D SOURCE LIMITATIONS 
I have been limited in the research for this paper to resources available through the library of 
the University of Cape Town, as well as searches carried out on my behalf by peers at the 
Australian National University and institutions in the UK, US and Turkey. None of these 
institutions have full access to the records of the proceedings of the annual colloquia of the 
International Institute of Space Law or recent editions of the Journal of Space Law. 
Understandably, this posed a significant challenge to my research, as the papers published in 
these fora explain and discuss the latest developments in State practice. Accordingly, I 
determined to limit the scope of my research to a textual analysis of the relevant treaty law. I 
draw on the travaux préparatoires for the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Agreement as 
                                                            
21 Outer Space Treaty art VI. 
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evidence of subsequent conduct in aid of the interpretation of those treaties. Limited 
reference is made to state practice where available, but such reference is not intended to fully 





II DOES ART I FREEDOM OF ACTIVITIES PERMIT A MARS SETTLEMENT? 
A INTRODUCTION 
Article I Outer Space Treaty provides: 
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of 
their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all 
mankind. 
Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration 
and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in 
accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial 
bodies. 
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-
operation in such investigation.22 (emphasis added) 
Two distinct, though related, concepts emerge: the degree of freedom of activities in outer 
space, and the distribution of the benefits of those activities. These two concepts are often 
conflated in the context of ongoing debates over the legality of asteroid mining. Analysis of the 
plain language of Article I is often overlooked in favour of a combined reading Article I and II 
through the lens of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ principle, developed in the Moon 
Agreement and United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea.23 In this chapter, I analyse 
the language of Article I in order to determine whether actors are free to establish a human 
settlement on Mars. In Chapter III, I explore the extent to which profits must be shared among 
the States Parties.  
                                                            
22 Outer Space Treaty art I. 
23 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 
entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3  
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In order to answer this question, I examine the ambiguity of certain words and phrases in 
Article I. In particular, I examine the concepts of ‘freedom’, ‘use’ and the ‘province of mankind’. 
I draw on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties24 as an interpretative guide. Even 
though the Outer Space Treaty pre-dates the entry into force of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties in 1980, it is well-established that the content of Arts 31 and 32 reflect pre-
existing customary international law, and accordingly may be applied in its interpretation.25 
This also permits its application even though not all parties to the Outer Space Treaty are 
parties to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.26 The interpretative exercise requires 
examination of the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the word or phrase, its use in context, any related or 
subsequent agreements, and the object and purpose of the treaty.27  If the meaning of the 
phrase remains ambiguous despite this analysis, Article 32 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties allows recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, such as the travaux 
préparatoires. These elements are considered in ‘a single combined operation’28 in a manner 
‘more an art than a science’.29  
Article I paragraphs 2 and 3 provide that a celestial body, such as Mars, is ‘free’ for exploration, 
use, and scientific investigation. In the case of scientific investigation, international co-
operation is to be facilitated and encouraged by States. This section explores the content of 
this freedom and considers whether the establishment of a human settlement falls within the 
permitted range of activities.  
                                                            
24 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into 
force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331. 
25 Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (‘Ikzeren Rijn’) Railway (Belgium v Netherlands (Award) 
(2005) 27 RIAA 35 [45]. 
26 Crema, L, ‘Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice within and outside the Vienna 
Convention’ in Nolte G [ed] Treaties and Subsequent Practice (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
10.  
27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 31.  
28 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ 




B WHAT IS ‘FREEDOM’  
The term ‘freedom’ in Article I paras 2 and 3 is an allusion to the Lotus principle, being that 
States are by default free to act, and that ‘restrictions on the independence of [the State] 
cannot […] be presumed’.30 Accordingly, ‘freedom’ in this context means that a State is entitled 
to use, explore or scientifically investigate without seeking permission from other States or an 
international coordinating body, such as the United Nations.31 This section explores the extent 
to which States are free to act in space; and accordingly, the activities of private actors that 
they may permit and regulate.  
C IS SPACE SETTLEMENT ‘EXPLORATION’, ‘INVESTIGATION’ OR ‘USE’? 
It is unclear whether the establishment of a human settlement and its ongoing maintenance 
might fall within the meaning of ‘exploration’, ‘investigation’ or ‘use’ in Article I paras 2 and 3. 
A space settlement would require the construction and placement of installations on the 
surface of the celestial body, using a combination of materials brought from Earth and 
recovered from the settlement site.32 Settlers would conduct scientific experiments and 
attempt agriculture.33   
The definitions of ‘exploration’ and ‘investigation’ are not debated in scholarly works or in the 
travaux préparatoires. ‘Exploration’ is understood to constitute activities aimed at ‘the 
discovery of something new or yet unknown’34 and may include ‘activities that aim at the 
discovery of resources which can eventually be exploited’.35 ‘Scientific investigation’ is more 
                                                            
30 S.S. ‘Lotus’ (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ (Ser A) No 10, 18. 
31 Hobe, S and Chen, K, 'Legal status of outer space and celestial bodies' in Ram, S J and 
Dempsey, P S [eds], Routledge Handbook of Space Law (Routledge, United Kingdom, 2017) 
25.  
32 Musk, above n. 4, 49.  
33 Moskowitz, C, ‘Farming on Mars: NASA Ponders Food Supply for 2030s Mission’ (May 2013) 
space.com <https://www.space.com/21028-mars-farming-nasa-missions.html> (date 
accessed: 18 February 2018); Gordan, G, ‘Can Plants Grow With Mars Soil?’ (August 2017) 
NASA.com https://www.nasa.gov/feature/can-plants-grow-with-mars-soil (date accessed: 18 
February 2018).  
34 Hobe and Chen, above n. 31, 31.  
35 Ibid, 32. 
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specific, being activities aimed at gaining knowledge about these discovered objects or areas.36 
The establishment and maintenance of a human settlement on Mars would involve a number 
of activities, such as rover missions and on-base experiments, which fall neatly into the 
categories of ‘exploration’ and ‘investigation’. Article I clearly permits States to pursue such 
activities. However, the construction of surface settlements, the conduct of agriculture and 
the conversion of space resources into fuel or consumables are less obvious.  
The definition of the third category of activity, ‘use’, is more vague and, as a result, has been 
contested.37 Does the concept of ‘use’ extend to exploitation or extraction of space resources? 
Even before the treaty’s conclusion, this was a contentious issue. This question was raised by 
the representative of France during the Outer Space Treaty debates, Mr Deleau: 
Did the […] term imply use for exploration purposes, such as the launching of satellites, 
or did it mean use in the sense of exploitation, which would involve for more complex 
issues? Space, of course, was already being used for meteorological research and 
telecommunications, but in the case of celestial bodies it was hard at present to 
conceive of utilizing the Moon, say, for the extraction of minerals.38 (emphasis added) 
The Soviet perspective, offered by representative Mr Morozov in response to Mr Deleau, was 
that the treaty  
could deal only with the problems arising at the current stage of human evolution, and 
future developments would give rise to new problems requiring subsequent solution. 
But it would be unwise to look too far ahead and to attempt to prescribe rules for 
                                                            
36 Ibid, 32. 
37 Myers, J, 'Extraterrestrial Property Rights: Utilizing the Resources of the Final Frontier 
Comments' (2016) 18 San Diego International Law Journal 77, 91; Tronchetti, F, 'Legal 
aspects of space resource utilization' in Von der Dunk, F and Tronchetti, F (eds), Handbook of 
Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc, 2015) 781. 
38 LSC Summary Records, UN GAOR, 2nd comm, 5th sess, 63rd mtg, UN doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 
(16 July 1966) 8 (France). 
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situations on which it was impossible to form adequate judgment at the present 
stage.39 
While the legality of space resource exploitation is very much contested,40 this debate is 
entirely directed at commercial resource extraction and generally centres around the legal 
status of celestial bodies under the ‘province of mankind’ principle and the Article II ban on 
appropriation.41 While the construction and maintenance of a space settlement is anticipated 
to require some extracted resources (rocks and minerals for building materials, water for 
consumption and fuel),42 other aspects such as agriculture and construction can more easily 
be understood as ‘use’ activities.  
While this use case is not considered in the leading academic works, the distinction between 
‘use’ and ‘exploitation’ has been considered. Von der Dunk observes that while at the time of 
drafting the Outer Space Treaty the possibility of exploitation of celestial bodies for activities 
such as communications using satellites  was not substantially taken into account, ‘it has 
meanwhile generally been agreed that ‘use’ in this context also includes such ‘exploitation’.’43 
Cheng, cited with approval by Hobe and Chen, endorses a generally broad interpretation of the 
concept of ‘use’, to encompass ‘all activities intended for space […] including Earth-based 
operations.44 I conclude, all elements considered, that classification of activities related to the 
establishment and maintenance of a Mars settlement as ‘use’ is unlikely to be considered 
problematic.  
                                                            
39 LSC Summary Records, UN GAOR, 2nd comm, 5th sess, 63rd mtg, UN doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 
(16 July 1966) 10 (USSR).  
40 Tronchetti, 'Legal aspects of space resource utilization', above n. 37, 769, citing Tronchetti, 
F, The Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: A Proposal 
for a Legal Regime (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009); see generally Pop, V, 'Appropriation in 
Outer Space: The Relationship Between Land and Ownership and Sovereignty on the Celestial 
Bodies' (2000) 16 Space Policy 275.   
41 Discussed in Chapter IV. 
42 Musk, E, above n. 4, 49.  
43 Von der Dunk, above n. 19, 57. 
44 Hobe and Chen, above n. 31, 32 citing Bin Cheng ‘Revisited: International Responsibility, 
National Activities and the Appropriate State’ (1998) 27 Journal of Space Law 19.  
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D CLARITY IN THE MOON AGREEMENT? 
The Moon Agreement was considered and elaborated by the Legal Subcommittee of 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (‘COPUOS’) between 1972 to 1979, was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 and entered into force in 1984. The treaty was 
an elaboration of some of the key principles contained in the Outer Space Treaty, particularly 
as they applied to celestial bodies45. In particular, the treaty explicitly anticipates and permits 
the establishment of manned space stations on and below the surface of celestial bodies. 
Article VIII(2)(b) provides that ‘States Parties may … [p]lace their personnel, space vehicles, 
equipment, facilities, stations and installations anywhere on or below the surface of the 
Moon.’46 Art IX(1) provides that ‘States Parties may establish manned and unmanned stations 
on the Moon. A State Party establishing a station shall use only that area which is requirement 
for the needs of the station.’47 This freedom is constrained by the requirement not to interfere 
with the activities of other States Parties,48 to inform the Secretary-General of the UN of the 
location and purposes of that station49 and to be ‘installed in such a manner that they do not 
impede free access to all areas of the Moon’.50 
This apparent clarity does not wholly resolve the question of whether a human settlement of 
Mars is permissible in international law. As discussed elsewhere in this paper, while the Moon 
Agreement did enter into force in 1984, in practice it is considered a failed treaty. This is 
because it has not been ratified by any major space-faring country. To date, it has been signed 
or acceded to by only 18 states.51 Accordingly, while a State Party to the Moon Agreement may 
                                                            
45 Moon Agreement art I para 1 ‘provisions of this agreement relating to the Moon shall also 
apply to other celestial bodies within the solar system except the Earth’. 
46 Moon Agreement art 8(2)(b). 
47 Moon Agreement art 9(1). 
48 Moon Agreement art 8(3). 
49 Moon Agreement art 9(1). 
50 Moon Agreement art 9(2). 
51 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Agreement Governing the Activities of 
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Status of the Treaty (January 2018) 
<http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/Moon> (date accessed: 18 February 2018). 
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purport to rely on these provisions in an eventual establishment of a human settlement on 
Mars, in practice they carry little weight. 
The next question, therefore, is whether the Moon Agreement and its travaux préparatoires 
may be considered ‘subsequent practice’ that ‘establishes the agreement of the parties’ to the 
Outer Space Treaty per Article 31(3) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If so, it may be 
used as a tool to interpret the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘activities’ discussed in this section. In my 
view, the Moon Agreement cannot be said to be practice that reflects the agreement of the 
parties. While it was intended to elaborate and reaffirm the principles of the Outer Space 
Treaty, including freedom of activities,52 the failure of the treaty to attract the support of the 
major space-faring nations such as the USA and Russia, and only 18 ratifications to the Outer 
Space Treaty’s 105,53  must disqualify it from this status.  
E CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I asked whether the freedom of activities in Article I Outer Space Treaty is 
sufficiently broad to permit the establishment and conduct of a human settlement on Mars. I 
conclude that it likely is. While the building of a station or other installation using resources 
brought from Earth falls squarely within the definition of ‘use’, it is other activities associated 
with the maintenance of a settlement that involve the exploitation or extraction of resources 
that give pause. The Moon Treaty does not determine the question either way. Absent future 
agreement to define the term ‘use’ and regulate the exploitation of resource, state practice 
will determine the threshold for acceptable activity. As asteroid mining becomes feasible and 
widely practiced, this will be a valuable source of evidence for states’ understanding of the 
limitations of Article I.    
  
                                                            
52 Moon Agreement preamble. 
53 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies: Status of the Treaty’ (December 2016) 
<http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space> (date accessed: 18 February 2018).  
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III CAN THE SETTLEMENT MAKE A PROFIT? 
Article I paragraph 1 of the Outer Space Treaty is framed as a single sentence, but contains two 
discrete provisions:  
(1) That the ‘exploration and use’ of outer space and celestial bodies ‘shall be carried out 
for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of 
economic or scientific development’, and 
(2) That the ‘exploration and use’ of outer space and celestial bodies ‘shall be the province 
of all mankind’.54  
The precise import of these provisions is a matter of ongoing controversy, both as to their 
content and their force. Does their combined reading mean that profits and resources derived 
from space activities should be distributed equally among all States? Is it a definitive guiding 
principle of space law, or is it a merely aspirational statement, its vagueness deliberately 
designed to facilitate later negotiations? In this section, I outline the various positions taken 
over the course of the treaty negotiations and subsequent developments in the law and assess 
their merits by means of Article 31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties analysis. In 
particular, I ask what ‘province of mankind’ means – and is it the same as the concept of 
‘common heritage of mankind’, found in the Moon Agreement and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea? 
A AMBIGUITY OF TERMS 
1 ORIGINAL MEANING: ‘PROVINCE OF MANKIND’  
The phrase ‘province of mankind’ is unique to the Outer Space Treaty; it has not found 
expression in international instruments before or since. It was introduced in the 1966 Soviet 
draft of Article I paragraph 1 of the treaty, the language of which was adopted almost exactly.55 
Rana observes that the ‘frenetic environment’ in which space law has developed, as well as the 
                                                            
54 Outer Space Treaty art I.  
55 Gabrynowicz, J I, 'The ‘Province’ And ‘Heritage’ Of Mankind Reconsidered: A New 
Beginning' (Paper presented at the 2nd Conference on Lunar Bases and Space Activities, 
Houston, Texas, 5-7 April 1988) 691.  
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‘vagueness’ of the specific phrase, has ‘given rise to volumes of competing definitions, 
arguments and positions regarding the legal ramifications of the mankind provisions’.56 The 
practical result of this has been the ‘failure to articulate, internationally, the legal substance of 
these subjects.’57 In an analysis of the strategy of semantics in the Outer Space Treaty, German 
scholar Bueckling laments that the ‘generalised formulas used in space law’ are of such ‘poor 
and inadequate substance’ that ‘the law is bound to go off-course on the ocean of facts’.58 Its 
meaning was questioned during negotiations by representatives of the United Kingdom,59 
Cyprus,60 Italy,61 France62 and India.63 Mr Darwin of the UK is reported as having ‘had some 
difficulty in understanding the phrase ‘the province of all mankind’ in the first sentence of 
Article I of the Soviet text’.64 
The term ‘mankind’ as a subject of the provision is particularly troublesome. Bueckling asserts 
that the use of the term ‘immerses the entire scene of outer space in the ethereal light of a 
lofty humanity’ which ‘conceal[s] reality in that they speak of a harmonious world, while leaving 
the numerous conflicts of interest largely unsolved’.65 ‘Mankind’ carries multiple meanings – a 
social or legal system centred on the individual; a group of peoples, States or groups of States; 
                                                            
56 Rana, H S, 'The Common Heritage of Mankind &(and) the Final Frontier: A Revaluation of 
Values Constituting the International Legal Regime for Outer Space Activities Note' (1994) 26 
Rutgers Law Journal 225. 
57 Ibid, 225. 
58 Bueckling, Adrian, 'The Strategy of Semantics and the 'Mankind Provisions' of the Space 
Treaty' (1979) 7 Journal of Space Law 15, 17.  
59 LSC Summary Records, UN GAOR, 2nd comm, 5th sess, 63rd mtg, UN doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 
(16 July 1966) 9 (United Kingdom).  
60 GA Verbatim Records, UN GAOR, 1st comm, 21st sess, 1493rd mtg, UN doc A/C.1/SR.1493 
(17 December 1966) 43 (Cyprus). 
61 LSC Summary Records, UN GAOR, 2nd comm, 5th sess, 64th mtg, UN doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.64 
(21 July 1966) 4-5 (Italy).  
62 LSC Summary Records, UN GAOR, 2nd comm, 5th sess, 64th mtg, UN doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.64 
(21 July 1966) 6 (France). 
63 LSC Summary Records, UN GAOR, 2nd comm, 5th sess, 63rd mtg, UN doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 
(16 July 1966) 11 (India). 
64 LSC Summary Records, UN GAOR, 2nd comm, 5th sess, 63rd mtg, UN doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 
(16 July 1966) 9 (United Kingdom). 
65 Bueckling, above n. 58, 18. 
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or a ‘politically-ideologically oriented composite body’.66 Which of these meanings is intended 
by the drafters is unclear. Mankind is not, in any event, a defined subject of international law. 
This issue was raised during treaty negotiations, for example by the representative for Cyprus 
who observed that ‘the treaty went beyond international law and the Charter, which regarded 
nations as independent sovereign agents, whereas the treaty saw mankind as a single entity.’67 
A review of the travaux préparatoires indicate that despite questions being raised, the 
definition of ‘mankind’, and its status as a subject of international law, was not agreed at this 
time.   
The term ‘province’ is not subjected to the same scrutiny in the academic literature or in the 
travaux préparatoires. It is unclear, however, what sense of the word was intended by the 
drafters. ‘Province’ carries two meanings in the English language – the literal sense being a ‘a 
territory, region, or subdivision’, and a more figurative sense being ‘a sphere of action, 
influence, or responsibility; the proper function or area of concern of a particular person or 
group.’68 Recall that Article I paragraph 1 provides that it is the ‘exploration and use’ of outer 
space and celestial bodies that ‘shall be the province of all mankind’ – not that outer space and 
celestial bodies are themselves the ‘province of mankind’. The former reading invokes the 
‘sphere of action’ meaning of ‘province’; the latter invokes the territorial meaning. Taking this 
into account, my view is that the more correct reading of the provision is that ‘activities in 
outer space and on celestial bodies is a proper area of concern and responsibility for mankind’.  
2 ASPIRATIONAL OR BINDING? 
‘Province of mankind’, read this way, is purely declaratory, and basically meaningless. This view 
is shared by the scholarly sources such as Goldman, Rana and Myers, who each assert that it is 
                                                            
66 Ibid, 18.  
67 GA Verbatim Records, UN GAOR, 1st comm, 21st sess, 1493rd mtg, UN doc A/C.1/SR.1493 
(17 December 1966) 43 (Cyprus). 
68 Oxford English Dictionary, ‘Province, noun’ (September 2007) <www.oed.com> 
(subscription service) (date accessed: 18 February 2018).   
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a ‘Statement of aspiration, rather than an enforceable rule’.69 Cheng concludes that the 
travaux préparatoires  
clearly show that its draftsmen hardly intended this part of Article 1 to be anything 
more than a declaration of principles from which no specific rights of a legal nature 
were to be derived.70 
Although not specifically stated, this may have been the reasoning of the representative for 
India, who ‘expressed some doubt as to whether [the article] dealt with a specific legal 
obligation’ and, therefore, ‘whether its inclusion in the body of the text was warranted’.71 This 
was echoed by the representatives for Italy and France who suggested that the entire text of 
Article I paragraph 1 be placed in the preamble, rather than the body of the treaty. This view 
has also been expressed after the entry into force of the treaty. Bueckling reports that the 
opinion of the Soviet delegation, expressed in a UN working paper from later negotiations over 
the Moon Agreement was that ‘province of mankind’ carries no substantive significance.72 
Myers reports that the United States representative to the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS 
stated in a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate that Article I 
represents a ‘goal’, that is not a ‘free ride’ for non-contributing countries.73  
B  SUBSEQUENT STATE PRACTICE: HAS THE MEANING OF ARTICLE I CHANGED? 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Article 31(3) Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties 
provides that ‘subsequent practice’ of parties to a treaty ‘which establishes the agreement of 
the parties’ may be used to interpret a treaty.74 Accordingly, a critical question is whether in 
the 50 years since the entry into force of the treaty, any new agreement has been reached by 
                                                            
69 Goldman, N C, American Space Law: International and Domestic (Iowa State Publishers, 1 
ed, 1996), 70; Rana above n. 56, 229; Myers above n. 37, 91. 
70 Cheng, above n. 44, 234.   
71 LSC Summary Records, UN GAOR, 2nd comm, 5th sess, 63rd mtg, UN doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 
(16 July 1966) 11 (India). 
72 Bueckling, above n. 58, 19. The citation provided by Bueckling at footnote 27 could not be 
verified.  
73 Myers, above n. 37, 91. 
74 Kohen, M, 'Keeping Subsequent Agreements and Practice in Their Right Limits' in Nolte, G 
(ed), Treaties and Subsequent Practice (Oxford University Press, 2013) 34.   
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the parties as to the meaning of Article I paragraph 1. While there is no proscribed list of 
conduct which might be considered ‘subsequent practice’, Kohen cautions against including 
‘all sorts of acts’ such as resolutions of international organisations, judicial decisions and policy 
positions – it is preferable to understand subsequent practice as referring to conduct by the 
parties ‘in the implementation of the treaty’.75 The practice must reflect a shared 
understanding of the meaning of the treaty. As the ICJ explained in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
case,76 unilateral conduct or expressions of interpretation cannot automatically amount to 
subsequent practice. Further, it is only the practice of States that should be taken into 
consideration. Even though the Outer Space Treaty affects the activities of private entities and 
non-State organisations, their conduct can only ‘serve as a catalyst’77 for States Parties. To 
borrow Kohen’s analogy of a fisherman or investor, what is decisive is not what a space 
entrepreneur does, but the reaction of the parties to the treaty that counts as ‘subsequent 
practice’.78  
The views of the States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty have been expressed in a number of 
ways since its inception; the question of whether such expressions constitute sufficient 
agreement for the interpretation of Article 1 paragraph 1 is contested. In this section, I examine 
the development of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ principle and its contested application 
to the Outer Space Treaty. As sources of ‘subsequent practice’ I rely primarily on the records 
of the debates of the Moon Agreement, and the records of COPUOS.  
In the two decades following the coming into force of the Outer Space Treaty, two 
interpretations of Article I paragraph 1 emerged from the States Parties and scholars to 
challenge the notion discussed earlier in this chapter that the provision is of no substantive 
effect. One interpretation is that space and celestial bodies are the ‘common heritage of 
mankind’; the second is that space and celestial bodies are ‘global commons’. Von der Dunk 
sets out the key definitional differences between global commons and ‘Common Heritage Of 
                                                            
75 Ibid 34 citing Boisson de Chazournes, L, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Pratique en Droit International?’ 
in SFDI La Pratique et le Droit International (Pedone, 2004) 13-47.  
76 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) (Judgment) [1999] ICK Rep 1045, [52]-[70], [79].  
77 Ago, R, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility’ (1972) 2 ICL Yearbook 97, [65].  
78 Kohen, above n. 74, 41-42. 
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Mankind’ as expressed in Article XI Moon Agreement.79 Outer space as global commons is 
defined by the fundamental freedom for individual States to act, unless specific international 
obligations that constrain this freedom are agreed upon. The provisions of the Outer Space 
Treaty and the widely-accepted Liability Convention80 are examples of such agreed constraints. 
‘Common heritage of mankind’, as expressed in the Moon Agreement, carries the presumption 
that activities, in particular exploitation activities, are only permissible where explicitly 
authorised by the legal regime.81 
While the breakdown of these positions is typically described as being between newcomer 
non-space-faring and developing countries, and the so-called ‘space powers’, I will describe 
the flaws in that description. In this section I outline how these positions came to be held, and 
by whom; which (if either) might be considered most accurate; and the implications for profit 
and resource sharing for the human settlement on Mars.  
1 ‘COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND’  
(a) ACCESSION OF NEW STATES AND RESULTANT SHIFTS: 
The 1970s saw an explosion of growth in the number of countries acceding to the Outer Space 
Treaty and participating in other multi-lateral treaty negotiations, particularly newly 
decolonised and developing countries. Robinson and White describe how some of these 
countries ‘collectively evolved the opinion that since most international law developed prior 
to their attaining nationhood status, they were not generally bound by its tenets.’82 These 
countries argued that they were free to define international law as it applied to them.83 When 
it came to defining ‘province of all mankind’ and interpreting Article I Outer Space Treaty, they 
asserted that it meant that all nations had vested rights in common resources and should be 
                                                            
79 Von der Dunk, ‘International Space Law’, above n. 19, 57-58. 
80 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, ‘Status of International Agreements 
relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2017’ UN GAOR 2nd comm, 56th sess, UN 
doc A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.7 (23 March 2017).  
81 Moon Agreement art XI. 
82 Robinson, G S and White, H M, Envoys of Mankind – A Declaration of First Principles for the 
Governance of Space Societies (Smithsonian Institution, Washington DC, 1986) 187. 
83 They did, however, accept the Charter of the United Nations. See Tronchetti in Handbook 
of Space Law pge X 
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shared equitably among them.84 They asserted that the common resources require common 
management, and should be distributed between all countries regardless of who participated 
in the exploitation or extraction.85  
It was not until negotiations over the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea were 
underway that this interpretation came to be described as the ‘common heritage of mankind’.  
It was later included in Article 1 paragraph 1 of the Moon Agreement, which reads ‘the Moon 
and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind which finds expression `in the 
provisions of this Agreement, in particular in paragraph 5 of this article’.86 The underlying 
premise of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ doctrine is that property belongs to all people 
or peoples of all States.87 Fountain, citing Joyner, defines five elements generally considered 
central to the  doctrine: that the area is not subject to national appropriation, all States share 
in the management of the area, the benefits of exploitation of resources in the area are to be 
shared with all, the area is to be dedicated to peaceful purposes, and it is to be preserved for 
future generations.88 These elements fit neatly within the existing framework of the Outer 
Space Treaty, which already contains a ban on national appropriation (Article II) and reserves 
outer space for ‘peaceful purposes’ (preamble). Bueckling, in his essay on the semantic origins 
of what he terms the ‘mankind provisions’ considers that the notion of heritage evokes an 
‘ancient human norm’ – being that an heir is entitled to acquire, foster, increase and exploit 
an inheritance.89  
(b) WHAT WOULD ‘COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND’ MEAN IN PRACTICE? 
‘Common heritage of mankind’ is a very unpopular concept with space-faring countries and 
the space industries operating within their jurisdictions. If outer space is the ‘common heritage 
of mankind’, celestial bodies and resources belong to all countries equally; accordingly any 
                                                            
84 Tronchetti, ‘Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilization’, above n. 37, 785. 
85 Rana, above n. 56, 230-231. 
86 Moon Agreement art I. 
87 Von der Dunk, ‘International Space Law’ above n. 19, 196.  
88 Fountain, above n. 1, 1759 citing Joyner, C, ‘Legal Implications of the Concept of the 
Common Heritage of Mankind’ (1986) 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 190, 
191-92. 
89 Bueckling, above n. 58, 21. 
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benefit derived from space activities must be distributed equitably. This means that while 
participants in space industry are permitted to profit from their activities, those profits must 
be split up among all the States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty. It effectively functions as a 
tax on the successful exploitation of resources.  
The doctrine is perceived by space industry participants as an unfair divestment of the profits 
of private labour; rendering investment in space development risky and unprofitable.  Pop 
describes the outcome for non-space-faring countries as ‘reaping without sowing’.90 Fountain 
deems it a ‘socialistic means for redistributing wealth’ that is ‘at odds with the free-market 
mentality that now pervades the global economy’.91 The regime ‘fails to provide economic 
return on one's investment’92 that will diminish profits. 93 Assuming that development of space 
is a positive thing, many legal and political commentators argue that ‘common heritage of 
mankind’ should be eschewed because investors need to have a significant profit motive in 
order to do so.94 Of course, the flip side of this argument is that developing countries would 
obtain access to a new stream of resources to fund the development of their own space 
industries, which could have positive follow-on effects for development generally.  
‘Common heritage of mankind’ also means that an international regime would be required to 
establish the basis upon which exploitation could take place, such exploitation being bound by 
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the limits of the regime.95 including the establishment of a profit-sharing system. Given the 
experience of the Moon Agreement discussed below, this is likely to be difficult, time-
consuming, and not guaranteed of success. The negotiation of such a regime may, however, 
have positive follow-on effects as rules for environmental protection, debris mitigation and 
safety may be established with trade-linked consequences.  
(c) IS OUTER SPACE THE ‘COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND’? 
As described in an earlier chapter, the Moon Agreement is considered to have failed; the 
‘common heritage of mankind’ doctrine does not carry the force of law from that source. Can 
it be said, however, to have obtained force as an interpretation of ‘province of mankind’? 
Sources are sharply divided on both the equivalence of the terms, and the degree to which any 
equivalence is accepted.  
Most sources promoting the equivalence of the terms do so with little to no explanation; the 
authors proceeding to other questions of law on the assumption that ‘common heritage of 
mankind’ has displaced or redefined ‘province of mankind’. For example, Fountain’s otherwise 
detailed and methodical article ‘Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis Produced 
by the Common Heritage of Mankind Doctrine’ proceeds on the basis that Article I, when read 
in the context of the preamble’s ‘peaceful purposes’ and Article II’s ban on national 
appropriation, constitutes an expression of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ doctrine.96 This 
assumption ignores the three other elements of ‘common heritage of mankind’ as expressed 
elsewhere in her article, as well as the fundamental distinction between the freedom to act 
inherent in ‘province of mankind’ and the authorisation regime envisaged by ‘common 
heritage of mankind’.97 Fountain fails to connect these aspects of the doctrine to the language 
of the Outer Space Treaty, interpretations put forward by the States Parties, or subsequent 
State practice.  
 
Hobe and Chen commit a similar oversight in a chapter of the Routledge Handbook of Space 
Law. In discussing the ‘province of mankind’, the authors define and give the history of the 
                                                            
95 Von der Dunk, ‘International Space Law’, above n. 19, 58. 
96 Fountain, above n. 1, 1762. 
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‘common heritage of mankind’ doctrine, implying their equivalence, without additional 
commentary.98 Rana asserts that ‘the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 also expresses the common 
heritage of mankind intent, though in different terms’99 because ‘reasonably read’, the 
‘common heritage of mankind’ language used by the Moon Agreement ‘conveys a meaning 
similar to the province of all mankind language’ used in the Outer Space Treaty.100 These 
authors do not provide evidence of this view being held by the States Parties; a critical enquiry 
for the purposes of establishing that this interpretation constitutes subsequent State practice.  
 
The views of States Parties on the question are available in the travaux préparatoires to the 
Moon Agreement. The views of the representative for Argentina reflect many of the 
statements made by the developing and non-spacefaring nations around 1978.101 These 
countries hoped that ‘progress could be achieved on the basis of the principle, endorsed by the 
great majority of countries, that the Moon and its natural resources constituted the common 
heritage of mankind.’102 Equally, though, these countries did not put forward ‘common 
heritage of mankind’ as an established interpretation of Article I paragraph 1 Outer Space 
Treaty, but rather a new principle, elaborated during the negotiations to the United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea, to be included in a future treaty that ‘would ensure that all 
countries, and in particular the developing countries, would have an equitable share in any 
benefits resulting from activities carries out under the treaty, including the exploitation of the 
Moon’s resources’ (emphasis added).103 
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100 Ibid 227.   
101 See for example the views of Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Indonesia, Sweden and Turkey: LSC 
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The representative for Indonesia describes the tensions between the more numerous 
developing/non-space faring countries and the space powers that defined the negotiations.  
While ‘considerable progress had unquestionably been made’ as a result of ‘concerted efforts’, 
‘difficulties persisted on the legal status of the Moon and its natural resources’ because of the 
‘understandable’ concern of ‘certain nations’ who are already ‘in a position to harness’ the 
resources of the Moon. The representative for Indonesia stressed that the considerations 
inherent in the ‘common heritage of mankind’ doctrine ‘should be adequately reflected in the 
future treaty on the Moon, so as to facilitate the common use by all States of the resources of 
outer space’ (emphasis added).104 Like the representative for Argentina, this use of the future 
tense to describe the implementation of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ doctrine evidences 
a desire for future agreement; not an expression of belief in the current state of law. This state 
of disagreement is reflected in the spacefaring nations’ lack of interest in further defining the 
status of the Moon and celestial bodies.105 The German representative did not see the point in 
further definition,106 the Australian representative thought the question should be 
deprioritised in light of other more urgent considerations.107 The comments of the 
representative for Belgium recall the Soviet dismissal of the Outer Space Treaty language as 
lacking substance, warning against semantic discussions.108  
  
Although it entered into force, the Moon Agreement is considered to have failed. The travaux 
préparatoires clearly indicate that while many countries favoured the inclusion of the term 
during negotiations, it did not ultimately translate to adoption of the treaty. The record of 
negotiations from 1978 does not indicate that there was widespread agreement among States 
Parties to the Outer Space Treaty that ‘province of mankind’ in that original treaty should be 
understood to mean ‘common heritage of mankind’. It seems clear from the views of the States 
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in favour of its inclusion that the ‘common heritage of mankind’ language was intended to 
supplement the existing regulation of the legal status of celestial bodies in the Outer Space 
Treaty, not to refine it. It was an entirely new concept, born out of the Convention of the Law 
of the Sea negotiations. Indeed, both concepts are included in the body of the Moon 
Agreement -- ‘province of mankind’ is retained in Article IV, while ‘common heritage of 
mankind’ is defined in Article XI. The failure of the developing States to redefine the ‘province 
of mankind’ to ‘common heritage of mankind’ in accordance with their interests has been 
consistently affirmed by its exclusion from subsequent UN declarations and COPUOS 
reports.109 
2 GLOBAL COMMONS 
It is argued by most scholars reviewed for this paper that if Outer Space Treaty Article I has any 
substantive meaning, it is that space and celestial bodies are a ‘global commons’. That would 
mean that, in the same manner as fishing in the high seas, the exploitation of resources outer 
space is permitted to all States who has the capacity to access them, with no obligation to 
share those resources with others. This does not mean that the freedom of activities contained 
in Article I is unfettered; rather that any limits to such freedom would have to be imposed by 
general international consensus, typically by international treaties with global application, or 
by customary international law.110 The Outer Space Treaty itself already imposes some 
limitations on the Article I freedom; for example by requiring space activities to be conducted 
in accordance with international law111 and by requiring States to allow access to any space 
stations and installations by any other State on the basis of reciprocity.112 In the absence of a 
global regime regulating the exploitation of resources, celestial bodies are ‘fair game’ for 
commercial exploitation and extraction.  
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Fountain points out that a problem inherent with the application of this doctrine to outer space 
is the ‘tragedy of the commons’.113 Each State with spacefaring capacity can enjoy the benefit 
of exploiting the resources to their maximum, while the cost of that increased use is spread 
out over all countries.114 This risks being particularly unequitable in the context of space, where 
the financial and technological barrier for entry to exploitation activities is high. Developing 
countries may theoretically be deprived of the future benefit of space resources if resources 
are extracted and profits hoarded before they have a chance to develop a competitive space 
industry of their own.  
 
Such a policy, if unchecked by global agreement to regulation, might undermine the object and 
purpose of the Outer Space Treaty. A race to exploit the maximum resources of celestial bodies 
within current reach of human technology is unlikely, in my view, to advance the notions of 
international cooperation and the development of friendly relations between nations 
contained in the preamble. Most importantly, it is antithetical to the notion contained in Article 
I and the preamble that the use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all 
peoples, ‘irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development’. As Hardin 
observes, ‘ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.’115 
 
Von der Dunk does not share this pessimism. He posits that the broadness of the concepts of 
State responsibility and liability should provide some guarantees that the tragedy of the 
commons could be avoided in outer space.116 He further speculates that the references to 
international law, international cooperation and the interests of all countries described above 
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could ‘serve as a check (or at least the possibility of creating such checks) on unfettered 
unilateral usage of outer space to the detriment of all others.’117 This optimism is based on von 
der Dunk’s implied belief that an international regime might be established to regulate 
resource exploitation to curb excesses, in the manner of the Convention of the Law of the Sea 
or the Antarctic Treaty System.118 While this avenue is certainly available, the experience of 
the Moon Agreement warns that such an ambitious project is fraught with political danger. 
 
The likelihood of reaching such an agreement is undermined by the expressed position of the 
United States. The United States emphatically rejects the notion that outer space constitutes 
global commons. In a December 2017 speech, Dr Scott Pace of the National Space Council said 
 
outer space is not a ‘global commons’, not the ‘common heritage of mankind’, not ‘res 
communis’, nor is it a public good. These concepts are not part of the Outer Space 
Treaty, and the United States has consistently taken the position that these ideas do 
not describe the legal status of outer space. … [R]eference to these concepts is more 
distracting than it is helpful. To unlock the promise of space, to expand the economic 
sphere of human activity beyond the Earth, requires that we not constrain ourselves 
with legal constructs that do not apply to space.119 
 
These views were also expressed by the United States in the most recent report of the legal 
subcommittee of COPUOS.120 As a major space power, such emphatic rejection of the concept 
of global commons does not bode well for the regulation that would be necessary to preserve 
it.  
                                                            
117 Ibid, 57.  
118 Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force 
23 June 1961). 
119 Pace, S, ‘Space Development, Law, and Values’ (speech delivered at IISL Galloway Space 
Law Symposium, 
Washington, D.C., 13 December 2017). 
120 Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its fifty-sixth session, held in Vienna from 27 March 
to 7 April 2017, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN GAOR 60th sess, UN Doc 




The ‘frenetic environment’ in which the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaty was negotiated 
has given rise to ‘volumes of competing definitions, arguments, and positions regarding the 
legal ramifications of the mankind provisions’.121 Article I contains a transformational idea, 
that is ‘pregnant with possibility’122 – but limited in substance. I conclude that the provision 
itself carries insufficient substantive meaning to bear real force. The ‘province of mankind’ is 
empty rhetoric, designed to paint over the irreconcilable interests of free-market spacefaring 
nations and developing nations seeking to redress centuries of resource inequality through 
socialistic policy. ‘In the benefits and interests of all countries’ is less poetic, yet equally vague 
– it is meaningless in the absence of a mechanism for allocating and valuing property rights.  
The ‘common heritage of mankind’ is a new concept to international law; any attempt to 
read it back into the Outer Space Treaty is in error. If widespread agreement on the concept 
had been established during negotiations for the Moon Agreement, there may have been 
strong grounds to consider it a clarification of Article I Outer Space Treaty. This is, however, 
simply not the case.   
Whether outer space is a ‘global commons’ is not so clear. While academic sources certainly 
agree that they consider it so; the States Parties have given very little indication of 
acceptance of this interpretation – either explicitly, or implicitly by pushing to establish a 
regulatory regime to preserve the commons. The conclusion for now, then, is in the negative.  
So what does all of this mean for the space settlement? In short, it means that any profit 
derived from the venture is not confiscated and redistributed to non-participating countries. 
It means that participants in private operations may have some confidence that they are 
entitled, in the ordinary course, to the benefit of any return generated on their investment.   
                                                            
121 Rana, above n. 56, 225. 
122 Rana, above n. 56, 225. 
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IV DOES THE ART II BAN ON APPROPRIATION CONSTRAIN THE ART I 
FREEDOM? 
A  INTRODUCTION 
Article II Outer Space Treaty provides that ‘outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 
occupation, or by any other means.’123 This provision is the subject of much scrutiny and 
debate. On its face, the provision means that a State may not annexe, colonise or otherwise 
acquire a celestial body under the general rules of international law; a planet is not an island.124 
This is a rejection of customary international law that applied before the entrance into force 
of the Outer Space Treaty, which held that the traditional conditions of acquisition of new 
territory applied on celestial bodies.125 In this section I consider whether that the ban on 
appropriation is inconsistent with the establishment of a settlement on Mars, and to what 
extent domestic jurisdiction might be exercised in the settlement. I consider whether the ban 
extends to private appropriation, and if space resources are objects of the ban.   
B  ‘APPROPRIATION’ 
Appropriation typically refers to the permanent taking of property for one's exclusive use or 
the exercise of exclusive control or use on a permanent basis. It follows that the building of 
structures on the surface of Mars may bring the State into conflict with this provision. This 
question has not been widely addressed in the scholarly works reviewed for this paper.126 
                                                            
123 Outer Space Treaty art II.  
124 For a demonstration of how the law of outer space might be revised to more closely 
resemble UNCLOS, thus treating planets more like islands, see Thomas, J C, 'Spartialis Liberum' 
(2005) 7(3) Florida Coastal Law Review, 579; Fountain, above n. 1, 1762. 
125 Smirnoff, M, 'The Legal Status of Celestial Bodies' [385] (1961) 28 Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce, 385; Jacobini, H B, 'Effective Control as Related to the Extension of Sovereignty in 
Space' (1959) Journal of Public Law (Spring) 97; Cheng, above n. 44, 229. 
126 Gorove, S, ‘Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty’ (1969) 37(3) Fordham Law 
Review 349 does briefly consider the question. However, as discussed in a subsequent section, 
Gorove holds a fairly radical view as to the right of private operators to appropriate space, as 
long as it is not carried out under sovereign power. His views, therefore, do not assist to 
determine the general proposition.  
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Article XII refers to ‘stations’ and ‘installations’ to which States Parties control access.127 Article 
VIII Outer Space Treaty also explicitly provides that ‘ownership of objects … landed or 
constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence 
in outer space.’128 If a settlement is composed entirely of objects landed or constructed on the 
surface of Mars, ownership rights over those objects is retained. In my view, this indicates that 
it is not the exclusivity of these installations that is to be avoided, but permanence. The notion 
of a Mars settlement implies a degree of permanence; whether this can be reconciled with the 
ban on appropriation of land requires careful consideration of the intentions of the drafters 
with respect to the use of the term.  
During negotiations for the Outer Space Treaty, some parties indicated that the rationale 
behind the non-appropriation principle was to avoid ‘a new type of colonialism on an 
interplanetary scale’.129 Article II was hoped to ‘prevent the rivalries that had poisoned 
relations between States during the age of earthly discoveries’130 and prevent the repetition 
of the ‘history of colonial regimes arbitrarily established in newly discovered territories.’131 The 
analogy of colonialism, Columbus’ first voyage across the Atlantic and the ‘discovery’ of the 
New World132 is rhetorically compelling, but, in my view, should be treated with caution. Mars 
is not inhabited by an existing human population who would be displaced or otherwise affected 
by settlement.133 While it cannot be said that Mars is terra nullius (because it belongs, in 
whatever fashion, to ‘mankind’)134, the risk of the repetition of the colonial experience does 
not necessarily follow. The representative for the then-USSR summed up this view saying that  
                                                            
127 Exclusivity considered further in Chapter V. 
128 Outer Space Treaty art VIII. 
129 FCGA Verbatim Records, UN GAOR, 1st comm, 21st sess, 1492nd mtg, UN doc A/C.1/SR.1492 
(17 December 1966), 462 (Chile).   
130 FCGA Verbatim Records, UN GAOR, 1st comm, 21st sess, 1492nd mtg, UN doc A/C.1/SR.1492 
(17 December 1966), 462 (Brazil). 
131 LSC Summary Records, UN GAOR, 2nd comm, 5th sess, 62nd mtg, UN doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.62 
(19 July 1966) 9 (Mongolia). 
132 GA Verbatim Records, UN GAOR, 1st comm, 21st sess, 1499th mtg, A/PV.1499 (Prov.) (19 
December 1966) 12 (Italy).  
133 The question of whether Mars and other celestial bodies might be home to non-human life, 
to which personhood might be due, is outside the scope of this paper.  
134 See Chapter II of this paper. 
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A treaty could deal with only the problems arising at the current stage of human 
evolution … future development would give rise to new problems requiring subsequent 
solution. But it would be unwise to look too far ahead and to attempt to prescribe rules 
for situations on which it was impossible to form adequate judgment at the present 
moment.135  
In the short term, settlement infrastructure may be designed with portability in mind in order 
to observe the letter of the law. In the longer term, however, as the settled population grows, 
installations that are more permanently integrated with the landscape may become critical to 
the comfort and prosperity of the settlement. Ultimately, it will be the response of States 
Parties136  to the gradual entrenchment of the installations that will determine to what extent 
these activities constitute an unacceptable ‘appropriation’.  
C JURISDICTION 
The concept of non-appropriation in Article II also has the effect of complementing Article VIII 
Outer Space Treaty on the question of the reach of domestic jurisdiction. Cheng asserts that 
Article II means that as among the contracting States, none will be entitled to exercise 
territorial jurisdiction, no matter on what basis, over any part of outer space or celestial 
bodies.137 This view is echoed by many scholars including Sharpe, Tronchetti and von der 
Dunk.138 As with the high seas, however, the exclusion of territorial jurisdiction does not 
undermine the presence of other forms of jurisdiction. Article VIII provides that a State Party 
shall ‘retain jurisdiction and control over [objects registered to them], and over any personnel 
thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body.’139  This combination of quasi-territorial 
                                                            
135 LSC Summary Records, UN GAOR, 1st comm, 5th sess, 63rd mtg, UN doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 
(16 July 1966) 10 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). 
136 Both in terms of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31(3)(b) and in terms of 
development of customary international law.  
137 Cheng, above n. 44, 230. 
138 Tronchetti, F and Sharpe, C, 'Legal Aspects Of Public Manned Spaceflight And Space 
Operations' in F Von der Dunk and Tronchetti, F (ed), Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2015) 618, 633; Von der Dunk, ‘International Space Law’ above n. 19, 69, 
77.   
139 Outer Space Treaty art VIII.  
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and personal jurisdiction is sufficient, in the absence of territorial jurisdiction, for domestic law 
to be applied within the confines of a human settlement.  
D NON-NATIONAL APPROPRIATION 
The inclusion of the modifier ‘national’ to describe the kind of appropriation that is banned has 
generated claims that it provides a ‘loophole’ allowing private appropriation of celestial 
bodies.140 Gorove is the key proponent of this theory.141 Gorove’s interpretation is a textual 
one: the Outer Space Treaty in its current form distinguishes the prohibited form of 
appropriation (‘national’) from other forms of appropriation, such as private appropriation. 
Thus, in his view, ‘an individual …  or a private association or an international organization could 
lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.142 
The debate to which these claims have given rise is heated, but in my view easily settled by 
reading Article II in the context of Article VI.143 Article VI provides that  
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities 
in outer space, including the Moon and celestial bodies, whether such activities are 
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities… The activities 
of non-governmental entities … shall require authorisation and continuing supervision 
by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.144   
Tronchetti asserts that in the context of Article VI, ‘national’ also includes private activities.145 
It follows that if a State is prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, then it ‘lacks the 
authority to licence its nationals or other entities subject to its jurisdiction to engage in that 
                                                            
140 See generally Pop, V, Appropriation In Outer Space: The Relationship Between Land And 
Ownership And Sovereignty On The Celestial Bodies, 16 Space Policy (2000) 275; Gorove, above 
n. 126, 42; O'Donnell, R H, 'Staking a Claim in the Twenty-First Century: Real Property Rights 
on Extra-Terrestrial Bodies Comment' [461] (2006) 32 University of Dayton Law Review 461.  
141 Gorove, above n. 126.  
142 Gorove, above n. 126, 42. 
143 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 31(1). 
144 Outer Space Treaty, art VI.  
145 Tronchetti, 'Legal aspects of space resource utilisation' above n. 37, 780. 
37 
 
prohibited activity.’146 Individuals can benefit from the freedoms of outer space and only 
insofar as States empower them to do so through national space legislation.147 This 
interpretation reflects the views of the International Institute of Space Law Board of Directors, 
expressed in a rare statement in 2004: 
Article II prohibition on national appropriation extends to private actors because 
pursuant to Article VI, the activities of non-governmental entities (private parties) are 
national activities.148  
Additionally, to grant some advantage to private operators over national and internationally-
cooperative operators in outer space would go against the ‘spirit and idea’ behind the Outer 
Space Treaty and space law generally – being the promotion of international cooperation.149  
 
E  APPROPRIATION OF RESOURCES 
More recently, debate has been generated by the proposition that space resources are also 
the object of this ban, accordingly whether it operates as a ban on the extraction of these 
resources as otherwise permitted by the freedom of activities contained in under Article I.150  
This is an important question for the purposes of a human settlement on Mars, because 
current models of space settlement rely on the use of resources such as water and minerals 
for subsistence and construction. The USA has unilaterally expressed the view that space 
resources are not subject to the Article II prohibition. In 2015 it passed the Spurring Private 
                                                            
146 Sterns, P M  and Tennen, L I, 'Privateering and Profiteering on the Moons and Other Celestial 
Bodies: Debunking the Myth of Property Rights in Space' (2003) Proceedings of the 45th 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 59; Sterns, P M, Stine, G H and Tennen, L I, 'Preliminary 
Jurisprudential Observations Concerning Property Rights On The Moon And Other Celestial 
Bodies In The Commercial Space Age' (1996) Proceedings of the 39th Colloqium on the Law of 
Outer Space 50, 53.  
147 Hobe and Chen, above n. 31, 30-31.  
148 Board of Directors of the International Institute of Space Law, 'Statement by the Board of 
Directors Of the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) On Claims to Property Rights 
Regarding The Moon and Other Celestial Bodies' (2004). 
149 Jenks, C W, Space Law (Frederick A. Praeger, 1 ed, 1965) 201. 
150 See Fountain above n. 1 1762; see generally Tronchetti, 'Legal aspects of space resource 
utilisation' above n. 37; Myers above n 37.  
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Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015151 which guarantees private 
actors rights in an ‘asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including the right to possess, 
own, transport, use and sell the asteroid resource or space resource.’152 
The 2017 report of the legal subcommittee of COPUOS indicates that this does not reflect the 
widespread understanding of the States Parties. Some States ‘expressed concern’ in that forum 
that the national legislation unilaterally enacted to protect private property rights in resources 
‘may amount to either a claim of sovereignty or a national appropriation of those bodies’ and 
thus could constitute a violation of Article II Outer Space Treaty.153 The committee has called 
for further research and negotiations to reach a satisfactory outcome.   
F CONCLUSION  
The Outer Space Treaty presents a conflicting image of how celestial bodies may be used. On 
the one hand, it expressly anticipates the presence of ‘stations’ and ‘installations’ on the 
surface of a planet; and yet Article II seems expressly to prevent States from exercising some 
ordinary rights of ownership over the area in which those structures are placed.  In my view, 
these are reconciled by taking a narrow view of Article II. At its core, it is intended to prevent 
States Parties from claiming territory in space; in particular to prevent powerful and resource-
rich countries from planting their flag and excluding all comers from the exploration, 
investigation and use of prime space. It does not seem intended to completely exclude the 
possibility of permanent structures on or below the surface of planets – this possibility does 
not appear in the travaux preparatoires to have been considered. Article II is aimed at the fair 
distribution of power and control among States exercising their Article I rights. I conclude, then, 
that if the natural progress of a human settlement on Mars requires the building of more 
permanent structures, and long-term activities such as agriculture, this is permissible under 
the terms of Article II. These structures and activities may not, it is certain, be used as evidence 
                                                            
151 Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, Pub L 114-
90, ss 52302-51303. 
152 Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, Pub L 114-
90, ss 52302-51303. 
153 Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its fifty-sixth session, held in Vienna from 27 March to 
7 April 2017, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN GAOR 60th sess, UN Doc 
A/AC.105/1122 (18 April 2017) [74]-[76].  
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of territorial acquisition by the supervising State. This will become relevant in circumstances 
where a rival intends to establish a second settlement in proximity to the first. The first 









V CAN THE SETTLEMENT EXCLUDE OUTSIDERS? 
A INTRODUCTION 
If it is accepted that a private actor might establish and maintain a human settlement on Mars, 
a subsequent logical question is to what extent that actor is entitled to exercise the rights of 
ownership over that settlement. The bundle of ownership rights includes possession, control, 
exclusion, enjoyment and disposition. While it was established in Chapter IV that by operation 
of Article II Outer Space Treaty a State may not own territory in outer space, Article VIII explicitly 
permits ‘ownership of objects … landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their 
component parts.’154 
In this chapter, I narrow in on the right of exclusion. Assuming that the human settlement is 
established, to what extent might that settlement exclude other people and States from access 
and use of its facilities? Specifically, to what extent might a settlement be obliged to permit 
uninvited outsiders, such as from a rival company or State, to take up unauthorised residence 
in the settlement? As a general principle, Article I Outer Space Treaty provides that there ‘shall 
be free access to all areas of celestial bodies’.155 However, this is constrained by Article VIII that 
permits States to retain ownership, and accordingly the right of exclusion, over their stations 
and installations. Where such stations or installations are on the surface of a celestial body, 
these sections appear to be in conflict.  
B ARTICLE XII SITE VISITS 
The Outer Space Treaty explicitly anticipates two instances where States are required grant 
access to their stations or installations by other States or persons. The first is for planned site 
visits by State representatives. Article XII provides that  
[a]ll stations [and] installations … on … celestial bodies shall be open to representatives 
to other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall 
give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate 
                                                            
154 Outer Space Treaty art VIII.  
155 Outer Space Treaty art I.  
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consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure 
safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.156 
The term ‘visit’, the requirement of ‘advance notice’ and juxtaposition of ‘normal operations’ 
clearly imply that the kind of access required under this section is short-term and non-
integrative. In my view, Article XII read in conjunction with Article VIII (ownership of objects) 
operates as an accepted constraint on the Article I freedom of access.  
C ARTICLE V RENDERING ASSISTANCE TO ASTRONAUTS 
The second provision rendering the grant of access necessary is the requirement to ‘render 
assistance’ to an ‘astronaut’. Article V provides that  
States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind … In carrying 
on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one State Party 
shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties.157 
(emphasis added) 
The obligation to ‘render all possible assistance’ is clear. Both the subject and the object of the 
Article V Outer Space Treaty obligation is the ‘astronaut’. Who counts as an ‘astronaut’? The 
language of the Rescue Agreement, muddies, rather than clarifies, these waters. Although it 
uses the term ‘astronaut’ in the title twice,158 the body of the agreement refers exclusively to 
‘personnel of a spacecraft’.159 This leaves the status of many potential actors in outer space, 
such as the inhabitants of a Mars settlement and the non-crew passengers on a spacecraft 
undefined.  
Some progress on this issue has been made since the first space tourism flights. Seven ‘space 
tourists’ have flown to space to date; all flew on Russian spacecraft operated by the Russian 
                                                            
156 Outer Space Treaty art XII. 
157 Outer Space Treaty art V. 
158 Long title: Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the 
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space. 
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42 
 
Space Agency and all have visited the Russian module of the International Space Station.160 
Concern from other International Space Station participant States as to the status of the first 
space tourist, Dennis Tito in 2001, led to an agreement between the partner States on a 
classification of ‘spaceflight participants’ who are ‘individuals… sponsored by one or more 
partner(s)’ and include ‘engineers, scientists, teachers, journalists, filmmakers or tourists’ as 
distinct from ‘professional astronauts’.161 Von der Dunk observes that while this distinction 
currently only applies in the International Space Station context, the fact that the International 
Space Station comprises most of the current major space powers (excluding only China and 
India) means that their legal arrangements ‘stand a good chance of ultimately being a point of 
departure for developing relevant international law ultimately applicable to the whole 
world’.162  
 It follows from this position that Outer Space Treaty Article V does not apply to any person not 
classified as a professional astronaut, being all other participants in activities in outer space. 
Sundahl argues that if Article V does not directly apply to non-crew space activity participants, 
humanitarian considerations ‘should be imperative and therefore result’163 in the application 
of the Agreement to every human being in outer space.164  Von der Dunk strongly refutes this 
position, arguing that existing general humanitarian obligations165 to assist people in distress 
‘adequately cover what is necessary and justified for spaceflight’166. To extend Article V to all 
persons in outer space undermines the obvious specificity of the Rescue Agreement 
(‘astronauts’, not ‘persons’). Von der Dunk analogises tourists in the ‘high mountains or similar 
realms’; the inherent dangers of such activities are accepted willingly and only for pleasure (or, 
                                                            
160 See Wikipedia, ‘Space Tourism’ (17 February 2018) Wikipedia 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_tourism> (date accessed: 18 February 2018). 
161 Principles Regarding Processes and Criteria for Selection, Assignment, Training and 
Certification of ISS (Expedition and Visiting) Crewmembers (2001) s 3 
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162 Von der Dunk, F, ‘Legal Aspects of Private Manned Spaceflight’ in Von der Dunk, F and 
Tronchetti, F [eds] (2015) Handbook of Space Law 711.   
163 Ibid, 711.   
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I might add, any other personal goal such as notoriety or curiosity). No obligation exists to 
rescue or assist such persons at the risk of the rescuer’s life or resources.167  
I conclude that, for present purposes, the obligation to render assistance to ‘astronauts’ is a 
narrow one that likely excludes Mars settlers, and non-crew participants in private spaceflight. 
For that reason, Mars settlers are not obliged on the basis of Article V Outer Space Treaty to 
grant access to their settlement to other persons; in danger or otherwise.168  
D CONCLUSION 
I conclude that the Outer Space Treaty permits the settlement to exclude others from its 
‘installations’ and ‘stations’; but not from the general area in which such objects are placed. 
The right of exclusion is not absolute. The settlement must grant short-term access to ‘state 
representatives’ where adequate notice is given. Because settlers are not ‘astronauts’, they 
are not obliged to give other persons access to their facilities, even in circumstances where the 
other person requires assistance or may be in mortal peril. While the goal of international 
cooperation contained in the preamble may create a moral obligation on settlers to grant such 
assistance, it is not a legal one. In those circumstances, the question of duty to render aid or 
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It’s certainly not going to be a ‘vacation jaunt’.169 The practical obstacles to the establishment 
of a human settlement on Mars, and the human cost of such an endeavour, are difficult to 
imagine. What this paper has demonstrated is that the legal obstacles are, in some ways, just 
as fraught and unknowable as the journey itself.  
These are many legal aspects of space settlement that I have not addressed in this paper, and 
yet will be critical to the success of the venture. What of private operators who eschew the 
international legal regime entirely, and launch from a ‘flag of convenience’ State – can they 
claim to ‘own’ a planet, or an asteroid? Is ‘terraforming’ the environment for to comfort of 
settlers an act of appropriation? What about the conduct of space vehicles – if there are no 
roads or flight paths ‘owned’ by States, who controls traffic? Are settlers entitled to defend 
their right to exclude invaders by the use of weapons? What if those ‘invaders’ are in fact 
seeking asylum from persecution aboard a spacecraft?  
These questions, while fascinating, are premature, perhaps even by a century or more. As I 
demonstrated in this paper, the core legal principles discussed here have not yet translated to 
actionable rules of ownership and business conduct. The rules will not remain static even in 
the absence of much-needed formal agreement between the States Parties as to their 
meaning. The first States and companies to conduct asteroid mining activities will establish 
precedents for how, if at all, financial benefits will trickle down to non-participant States. The 
first States and companies to establish an installation on the surface of a celestial body will set 
a precedent for how protective it might be of that space; how actively it discourages 
newcomers from breaching its perimeters. It will be the reaction of the global community to 
those decisions, and not the language of the Outer Space Treaty, that will determine rules that 
govern the next life phase of our ‘interplanetary species’.  
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